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‘More Loophole than Law’: A Case for the Repeal of I.R.C. § 5271
Abstract:
This note advocates the repeal of I.R.C. § 527, which provides a tax exemption 
for organizations involved in election-related activity. The groups which operated under § 
527 in the 2004 election include the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, MoveOn.org, and 
American Coming Together. The note discusses how § 527 escaped regulation under 
both the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 (popularly known as McCain-Feingold). It examines the political reasons 
why the Federal Election Commission has not attempted to reform § 527. As a result, 527 
groups have acted largely without federal oversight in the last two Presidential elections. 
The note argues that the recent activities of 527 groups meet the Supreme Court’s 
evolving definition of corruption. It also argues that, despite the objections of critics of 
campaign finance reform, the repeal of § 527 would not violate the First Amendment. 
The note concludes with a discussion of the political realities which will drive the 
regulation (or repeal) of § 527 in the second Bush administration. 
I. Introduction
This paper will analyze I.R.C. § 527, which was passed by Congress in 1975 to 
provide a tax exemption to organizations involved in election-related activity.2 Due to the 
inertia of legislators and aggressive fundraising of partisan organizations, § 527 has now 
become the single largest conduit for election-related soft money contributions. In the 
2003-2004 election cycle, 527 groups raised and spent over half a billion dollars.3 The 
groups which flourished under § 527 in the 2004 election are familiar to most voters: 
MoveOn.org, America Coming Together (ACT), and the Swift Boat Veterans for Truth, 
to name but a few. 
I will argue that Congress should repeal § 527 for three reasons: (i) the Supreme 
Court has become increasingly willing to view the expenditures of 527 groups as a form 
of corruption; (ii) since the Court last spoke on § 527, these groups have become more 
central to the fundraising process, and more unscrupulous in their tactics; and (iii) § 527 
has survived as an unintended loophole under not one but two major campaign finance 
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laws: the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (“FECA”)4, and the Bipartisan 
Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) of 20025, popularly known as McCain- Feingold. In 
order to prevent § 527 from becoming an outlet for the corrupt practices so recently 
outlawed by the BCRA, Congress should repeal it before the 2008 election.
Any discussion of campaign finance law must begin with a short definition of soft 
money. The FEC defines soft money as “funds raised and/or spent outside the limitations 
and prohibitions of the FECA… Soft money often includes corporate and/or labor 
treasury funds, and individual contributions in excess of the federal limit, which cannot 
legally be used in connection with federal elections, but can be used for other purposes.”6
By contrast, hard money is that received and spent in accordance with FECA regulations. 
The 1996 election illustrates some of the typical uses of soft money. Both parties 
spent millions of dollars in soft money on pro-candidate “issue ads”, which were not 
subject to FECA simply because they avoided an explicit “electioneering message.”7 In 
addition, the national parties took advantage of the fact that while they could only 
allocate 35% of the cost of issue ads to soft money accounts,8 most states could allocate a 
far higher percentage--9 up to 67%, for example, in the case of Ohio.10 The DNC saved 
some $8M in hard money between 1995-6 by transferring funds to the state parties to run 
ads promoting President Clinton.11
FECA and the Origin of ‘Issue Advocacy’
FECA, enacted in 1971 and amended in 1974, required political committees to 
disclose: (i) the identity of their contributors; (ii) the dollar amount they contributed; (iii) 
the size of their expenditures or disbursements; and (iv) the recipients of these funds.12
When Congress drafted § 527, it simply assumed that the political organizations it 
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covered would be subject to these FECA regulations.13 Yet in the 1976 decision Buckley 
v. Valeo, the Supreme Court held that FECA requirements apply only to “expenditures 
for communications that in express terms advocate the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate for federal office.”14 Such communications contain “express words 
of advocacy of election or defeat, such as ‘vote for,’ ‘elect,’ ‘support,’ ‘cast your ballot 
for,’ ‘Smith for Congress,’ ‘vote against,’ ‘defeat,’ ‘reject.’”15
These terms are often referred to as Buckley’s ‘magic words.’ Political advocacy 
containing the magic words is known as “express advocacy”, while advocacy not 
containing the magic words is, by default, known as “issue advocacy”—called thus 
because it typically promotes issues associated with a candidate, without endorsing the 
individual directly.16 By simply avoiding the magic words, 527 groups remain narrowly 
within the bounds of issue advocacy and escape regulation under FECA.17 The BCRA did 
nothing to change this fact, since it outlawed other forms of soft money while leaving § 
527 untouched. As a result, § 527 became the outlet of choice (in fact, one of the only 
choices left) for organizations wishing to practice political advocacy in the 2004 election. 
Before discussing their activities, I will outline the complex rules governing 527 groups 
and their contributors. 
Rules for § 527 Political Organizations
Section 527 covers the tax treatment of all political organizations (for example, 
parties or committees) that are organized for the primary purpose of accepting 
contributions, or make expenditures, for an exempt function.18 An exempt function is 
defined as the practice of “influencing or attempting to influence the selection, 
nomination, election, or appointment of any individual to any Federal, State, or local 
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public office.”19 All contributions made to the organization for its exempt function are 
“exempt function income”, and excluded from its taxable income.20 527 groups are taxed 
on their investment income and any expenditures on non-exempt activities.21 In addition, 
amendments to § 527 passed in 2000 and 2002 require the groups to disclose their 
contributions and expenditures over certain limits. Groups that fail to do so must pay an 
amount equal to the highest corporate tax rate multiplied by the amount to which the 
failure relates.22
Rules for § 527 Donors 
Donors to 527 organizations enjoy two principal advantages. First, their 
contributions are not subject to gift tax.23 And second, there is no limit to the amount that 
donors may contribute to such groups, in contrast to the strict $2,000 limit on hard money 
contributions by individuals to federal candidates.24 Donors do not receive an income tax 
reduction, however, for the amount of their contribution.
Rules for 501(c)(3) Organizations 
Although this paper will concentrate on § 527, it will also make occasional 
reference to groups organized under I.R.C. §§ 501(c)(3) and (c)(4). These provisions are 
less appealing to organizations engaged in political advocacy, but could become more 
widely used (and abused) following the repeal or curtailment of § 527. This section will 
briefly outline the rules governing these groups, while Section V will discuss the ways in 
which (c)(3) and (c)(4) groups can be manipulated to promote political advocacy. 
Section 501(c)(3) provides a tax exemption for charitable organizations which “do 
not participate in, or intervene in (including the publishing or distributing of statements), 
any political campaign on behalf of (or in opposition to) any candidate for public 
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office.”25 Such organizations must be engaged in religious, charitable, scientific, literary, 
or educational activities, among others.26 The I.R.S. has made contributions to 501(c)(3) 
groups free from gift tax, by allowing donors to include contributions in the total amount 
of taxable gifts made during the year, but then deduct them from the gift total under I.R.C. 
§ 2522.27 In addition, donors can deduct contributions to a 501(c)(3) group under I.R.C. § 
170(c)(1). 
Rules for 501(c)(4) Organizations
Section 501(c)(4) provides an exemption to: 
Civic leagues or organizations not organized for profit but operated exclusively for 
the promotion of social welfare, or local associations of employees, the membership 
of which is limited to the employees of a designated person or persons in a particular 
municipality, and the net earnings of which are devoted exclusively to charitable, 
educational, or recreational purposes.28
Under I.R.C. § 2503(b), donors may exclude the first $11,000 of gifts to be made during 
the year to each recipient—including gifts to 501(c)(4) groups.29 Donations to (c)(4) 
groups in excess of this amount are presumably subject to gift tax. However, the law 
remains unsettled on this question, and the IRS consequently does not enforce gift taxes 
on contributions to (c)(4) groups.30 Donors cannot deduct their contributions to a (c)(4) 
group.  
The Birth of § 527
Congress added § 527 to the Internal Revenue Code in 1975 to clarify the tax 
treatment of political organizations.31 According to the 1974 Senate Report, Congress 
determined that encouraging political activities was an important policy goal, because 
they represent “the heart of the democratic process.”32 Congress sought to encourage 
such activities by granting a preferred tax status to qualifying political organizations.33 It 
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chose to treat political organizations as tax-exempt because, in the view of legislators, 
their activities do not represent a trade or business.34 At the same time, the drafters of § 
527 were concerned that candidates would use their campaign committees to earn 
investment income free of tax.35 As a result, they provided that 527 organizations should 
be taxed on their investment income and expenditures on non-exempt activities.36
Many of the advantages enjoyed by 527 groups are purely accidental. There is no 
evidence, for example, that Congress intended to shelter such groups from FECA 
disclosure requirements; this was an unanticipated result of Buckley’s decision to treat 
express advocacy separately from issue advocacy.37 Trevor Potter, a former Chairman of 
the FEC, has noted that 527 groups are protected by an “unintended misconnection” of 
federal laws: 
These laws were written by different Congressional committees, for different 
purposes, and are administered by different federal agencies with different 
administrative priorities. As a result, the existence of 527s engaged in candidate-
related political activity but not registered and reporting anywhere as political 
committees is accidental, rather than the result of Congressional policy. 38
It is clear that Congress never intended to permit 527 groups to operate with the freedoms 
they now enjoy. As a result, I will argue that Congress can repeal § 527 without 
undermining its own legislative policies. 
The Explosive Growth of 527 Groups
527 groups grew markedly in size and influence between the 1996 and 2000 
elections. Individuals, political parties, interest groups, labor unions and corporations 
spent $150M on issue ads in the 1996 election, $275M in the 1998 mid-term elections, 
and $509M in the 2000 election.39 Liberal 527 groups have outperformed conservative 
ones in the last three elections. The Center for Public Integrity reported that 527 groups 
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supporting John Kerry spent $186M in the 2004 cycle, while groups supporting President 
Bush spent $61M.40
Three of the largest left-leaning 527s are the Media Fund (run by former Clinton 
staffer Harold Ickes), America Votes, and America Coming Together (ACT). These 
organizations spent a combined $133M in the recent election.41 A number of liberal 
groups coordinated in the 2004 election to divide labor and maximize resources. America 
Votes served as a traffic cop between these organizations to prevent them from 
duplicating their efforts.42 Financier George Soros recently divided more than $23M in 
donations between several organizations dedicated to defeating President Bush.43 Other 
liberal 527 donors decided that they could exert maximum leverage by looking past 
Kerry altogether. They view themselves as “political venture capitalists”, supporting an 
infrastructure of organized 527 groups rather than an individual: 
These groups aren't loyal to any one candidate, and they don't plan to disband after the 
election; instead, they expect to yield immense influence over the party's future, at the 
very moment when the power of some traditional Democratic interest groups, like the 
once mighty manufacturing unions, is clearly on the wane… The new political venture 
capitalists see themselves as true progressives, unbound by any arcane party structure. If 
their investment ends up revitalizing the Democratic Party, so be it. If they end up 
competing with the party to control its agenda, or even pushing the party toward 
obsolescence -- well, that's fine, too.44
Politician 527s
Politicians have been just as enterprising in creating their own 527 groups. 
Virtually every Congressional leader has formed one.45 By setting up a ‘politician 527’, 
members of Congress can raise unlimited soft money from individuals, corporations and
unions. In a 2002 study cited by the Supreme Court in McConnell v. FEC46, Public 
Citizen scrutinized the 527s controlled by six Congressional leaders. These six (three 
Democrats, three Republicans) collected significantly more in contributions than the 527s 
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affiliated with other individual members of Congress. The study demonstrates that 
politicians have largely bypassed individual voters of average means in this 527 ‘arms 
race.’ Ninety-four percent of their total receipts were derived from contributions of
$5,000 or more, a figure that varied little across parties and positions. Between July 1, 
2000 and June 30, 2001, the six groups received 81 percent of their total contributions 
from corporations.47
One of the most heavily criticized politician 527s has been TRMPAC (Texans for 
a Republican Majority Political Action Committee), originally founded by House 
Majority Leader Tom DeLay (R-Texas).48 TRMPAC was highly successful in promoting 
Republican candidates running for state representative in 2002: all but 3 of 21 won, 
allowing the party to take control of the Texas House.49 Texas prosecutors have launched 
a grand jury investigation to determine whether the group laundered $190,000 through 
the RNC during the 2002 campaign.50
II. The Growth of 527 Abuses
This section will describe the mounting 527 abuses that have occurred between 
1990 and the 2004 election cycle, and the Congressional attempts to curb them. As the 
New York Times aptly summarized the elections since 1988, “With each new 
presidential election, the amounts of soft money raised by the political parties grew like a 
nuclear arms race. The loophole came to overshadow the law.”51
Crossing the Line from Issue to Express Advocacy
Buckley unfortunately did not clarify whether its list of magic words was an 
exhaustive, or merely representative, description of express advocacy.52 As a result, many 
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527 groups obey the letter but not the spirit of Buckley, by avoiding the magic words but 
in all other respects practicing express advocacy on behalf of candidates. The Supreme 
Court acknowledged this practice in the recent McConnell decision, stating that there is 
“overwhelming evidence that the line between express advocacy and other types of 
election-influencing expressions is, for Congress’ purposes, functionally meaningless.”53
The Court also stated that issue ads run within the final one to two months of an election 
are the functional equivalent of express advocacy, regardless of their precise language.54
The Court’s remarks only confirm what reform advocates have complained of for 
years: that 527 advertisements are clearly designed to support specific candidates, despite 
the fact that they avoid the language of express advocacy. Commentators frequently refer 
to 527 organizations as “stealth PACs”, running “sham issue ads” that unmistakably 
promote their candidate of choice.55 The Brennan Center notes that “90 percent of 
candidate ads—which are by definition considered express advocacy whether they use 
the magic words or not—did not employ magic words. The fact that so few candidate ads 
incorporate magic words highlights how unnecessary explicit words are to convey an 
explicit electioneering message.”56
The Republican National Committee underscored this point when it asked 
television stations to stop running ads by the 527 group MoveOn.org that criticized 
President Bush.57 The RNC claimed that the spots violated federal law prohibiting the use 
of unregulated soft money for advertisements advocating the election or defeat of a 
candidate.58 MoveOn.org attorney Joseph Sandler responded that, "The federal campaign 
laws have permitted precisely this use of money for advertising for the past 25 years.”59
The RNC letter quoted from recent FEC Advisory Opinion 2003-37, which stated that, 
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“Communications that promote, support, attack or oppose a clearly identified Federal 
candidate have no less a ‘dramatic effect’ on Federal elections when aired by other types 
of political committees, rather than party committees or candidate committees.”60 This 
point was not lost on supporters of President Bush, who began aggressively developing 
their own 527s in the final months of the election. 
Accountability and Reporting
Prior to the 2000 amendments to § 527, donors could make unlimited political 
donations to 527 groups without having to disclose their identity to the public. The most
notorious example of this was a series of ads run in the 2000 election by “Republicans for 
Clean Air”, a 527 created by Bush supporter Sam Wyly. The ads promoted George W. 
Bush’s environmental record while attacking that of Senator McCain. It remained unclear 
who had organized the ads until Wyly acknowledged that he funded them through a 
$2.5M donation. 61
Senator Lieberman (D-Connecticut), one of the most outspoken figures on 527 
reform, has denounced groups that adopt neutral-sounding names in order to mislead the 
public.62 One example is the generically named Citizens for Reform, incorporated as a 
501(c)(4) group in 1996 by Triad Management Services, a conservative consulting firm 
in Virginia. The group spent $1.4M on ads during the October 1996 Congressional races, 
including one criticizing Democratic Congressional candidate Bill Yellowtail of Montana 
for striking his wife.63 The group switched to § 527 status in 1997 after its activities as a 
501(c)(4) group were questioned.64 In response to such practices, Senator Lieberman 
charged that the § 527 loophole not only deprives voters of critical information, it 
“threatens the very heart of our democratic political process.”65
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The Swift Boat Veterans for Truth vividly illustrated this threat when it launched 
its anti-Kerry campaign in the summer of 2004. The 527 group's controversial television 
commercials charged that Kerry did not earn his Purple Heart medals in Vietnam.66 The 
media and other veterans present during the incidents largely discredited these claims in 
the weeks after they first appeared.67 Further controversy developed when the counsel for 
President Bush’s re-election campaign, Benjamin Ginsberg, acknowledged that he had 
advised the group.68 The Veterans received significant funding from Texas Republicans 
associated with the Bush family and presidential strategist Karl Rove.69
Kerry responded by filing a complaint with the FEC, charging that the 527 group 
was illegally coordinating its activities with the Bush administration. 70 Whether or not 
this charge is ever substantiated, the episode demonstrates how effectively unprincipled 
527 groups can serve their chosen candidate. In a campaign season of unprecedented 
spending by 527s, the Veterans achieved their goals at a very modest cost. The 
commercials which the group initially sponsored cost only a reported $500,000, 
suggesting that spending limits on 527 groups would do little to deter their 
effectiveness.71 The Veterans succeeded not because they were able to raise large 
amounts of soft money, but because they were willing to make false accusations. Their 
example raises the concern that in future elections, partisan groups will create 
‘disposable’ 527 groups to circulate false information, with the expectation that their 
message will be discredited after a few weeks. This would be a highly effective strategy 
posing little risk to their candidate, who can simultaneously denounce and benefit from 
their advertising. 
2000 and 2002 Amendments
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Previous attempts to regulate 527 groups have done little to prevent such corrupt 
tactics. In 2000, Senator Lieberman introduced an amendment adding a number of 
disclosure provisions to §527, which became §§ 527(i) and (j).72 Members of Congress 
were alarmed by the fact that no one even knew how many 527s existed, since they were 
not required to report their existence.73 As Scott Harshbarger of Common Cause 
remarked in 2000, “These committees are throwbacks to the off-the-books slush funds of 
the Watergate era.”74
Under § 527(i), an organization must give formal notice to the Secretary of the 
Treasury in order to receive tax-exempt treatment for campaign-related income.75 Section 
527(j) requires organizations to disclose the name and address of each contributor who 
gives more than $200 in the aggregate, as well as the name and address of each recipient 
of more than $500 in aggregate expenditures.76 The new provisions were widely 
criticized from the start, because their disclosure requirements created a vast amount of 
duplicative paperwork at the state and federal level.77 In addition, the bill exempted 
political committees established for state and local candidates from its periodic disclosure 
requirements.78 Non-compliance among 527s was widespread.79
These problems led Congress to introduce further amendments to § 527 in 2002.80
The changes were intended to reduce duplicative reporting while adding electronic filing 
requirements to track stealth PACs.81 Despite these new requirements, the IRS’s Internet
disclosure system for 527s remains extremely difficult to search.82 Public Citizen has 
compared the system to “an electronic file cabinet with 14,800 different, unlinked folders 
in it.”83 While the site allows one to search the paper and electronic filings of 527 groups 
by organization name and date, results appear in PDF format. More advanced searches 
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are only available for electronic filings.84 These limitations became frustratingly evident 
to the media, watchdog groups and congressional investigators looking into Enron 
contributions.85 None of them has yet identified all the contributions that Enron made to 
527 groups. The only way to do so would be to open all 72,000 records of 527s on file.86
In addition, one must ask whether sunlight is really the best disinfectant for the 
problems associated with 527 groups. The premise of disclosure, which Justice O’Connor 
has called an “essential cornerstone” of effective campaign finance reform, is that voters 
will adjust their preferences after learning who is paying for the issue advocacy of 
candidates.87 Yet how many voters are likely to inform themselves about the sources of 
issue advocacy financing, even when 527 records become more available? Is the average 
voter able to distinguish the Media Fund from America Coming Together, to name just 
two of the innumerable 527 groups now operating? We can analogize from party-
sponsored attack ads, which most voters recognize as unfair, and often inaccurate. Yet 
attack ads have proven highly effective, despite attempts by the media to report on their 
deficiencies. If voters are not motivated to research the context of attack ads sponsored 
by the candidates themselves, how likely are they to sift through the disclosure statements 
of 527 groups? 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act Upheld in McConnell v. FEC (2003)
The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (“BCRA”) of 2002 amended FECA to 
prohibit the use of soft money by national parties and federal officeholders. The Act did 
not extend FECA to regulate § 527. However, it did require that no organization can use 
corporate or union money to finance broadcast ads that feature federal candidates within 
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60 days of the national election.88 This includes 527 groups using corporate or union 
money to finance such ads.89
The Supreme Court upheld the major features of the BCRA in McConnell v. FEC, 
124 S.Ct. 619 (2003). Notably, the Court upheld an amendment to FECA § 323(d), which 
now states that national, state, and local party committees and their agents cannot “solicit 
any funds for, or make or direct any donations” to 527 organizations “other than a 
political committee, a State, district, or local committee of a political party, or the 
authorized campaign committee of a candidate for State or local office.”90 The Court held 
that it “narrowly construes § 323(d)'s ban to apply only to donations of funds not raised 
in compliance with FECA.”91 In other words, the Court interpreted this section of the 
BCRA as simply reaffirming existing FECA guidelines. The Court also cited the 2002 
Public Citizen account, previously introduced, which states that virtually every member 
of Congress has his or her own 527 group.92 The majority expressed concern that, “Given 
BCRA's tighter restrictions on the raising and spending of soft money, the incentives for 
parties to exploit such organizations will only increase.”93
2004 FEC Response
Frustrated by the lack of legislative clarity on § 527, several groups appealed to 
the FEC for guidance during the election. Americans for a Better Country, a pro-
Republican 527 organization, asked the FEC in November of 2003 to issue an advisory 
opinion outlining the permissible uses of § 527.94 And campaign finance watchdog 
groups, alarmed by the explosive growth of 527 groups, announced in January of 2004 
that they would file their own complaint with the FEC.95 They charged that three voter 
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outreach organizations-- America Coming Together, the Leadership Forum, and The 
Media Fund-- were schemes to avoid the federal ban on soft money.96
In response, the FEC issued a limited ruling in February, which covered only 
those 527s that raise soft money but also register as PACs with the FEC and raise hard 
money. The commission decided these organizations could not use soft money to fund 
mail, phone, broadcast or other communications that promote, support, attack or oppose 
federal candidates by name. However, the groups could use a mixture of hard and soft 
money to pay for communications that name candidates for federal and nonfederal 
office.97
More significantly, on May 13, 2004 the FEC announced that it would not impose 
new regulations on 527s for the remainder of the campaign season.98 “It’s a complex 
issue and a big expansion of the regulations, and it needs to be done right,” said Bradley 
Smith, the Commission’s Republican chairman.99 Ed Gillespie, chairman of the RNC, 
presciently responded that, “The 2004 elections will now be a free-for-all… the battle of 
the 527’s is likely to escalate to a full scale, two-sided war.”100
Smith added that the rulemaking process for 527s should be terminated altogether, 
because in his view lawmakers did not intend to limit these groups when they passed 
campaign-finance reforms.101 Reform watchdog groups vigorously objected. Fred 
Wertheimer, President of Democracy 21, acidly remarked that Smith was acting out of 
principle, “if you recognize that his principle is to do everything he can to undermine the 
campaign finance laws.”102
Smith has made no secret of his disdain for campaign finance regulation. He 
recently told Reason Magazine that his ideal system of campaign finance would be “the 
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system we had that elected Abraham Lincoln and Grover Cleveland, which is no 
regulation.”103 He has incensed proponents of campaign finance reform by advocating the 
repeal of FECA-- the very law the FEC is charged to administer.104  Senator McCain 
called on Smith to resign in response to such statements, and threatened to replace the 
Commission with a group more compliant with recent Court decisions.105 As McCain 
stated in April of 2004, “One of the problems the FEC faces today is that some 
Commissioners, and in particular Chairman Smith, refuse to accept the Supreme Court’s 
conclusions in the area of campaign financing.”106
In response to the FEC decision, conservative groups-- which had long protested 
that liberal 527s were acting illegally-- quickly switched gears and began to form their 
own 527 organizations.107 The conservative group Progress for America immediately 
announced that it would convert from § 501(c)(4) to § 527 status and challenge liberal 
groups for control of the 527 field.108 Despite their determination, pro-Republican 527s 
found risk-adverse corporations less willing to contribute than pro-Democratic donors.109
The Washington Post reported in July of 2004 that pro-Republican 527 groups were
“getting their clocks cleaned by their rivals.”110 By the end of October 2004, pro-
Democratic 527 groups had raised nearly three times as much as their Republican 
counterparts.111 Republican groups, however, eventually found their footing: Progress for 
America spent $16.8M in the final three weeks of the campaign, more than all other 
Democratic groups combined.112
III. The Evolving Definition of Corruption
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One of the central legal and ideological disputes surrounding 527s (and campaign 
finance reform in general) is whether unlimited soft money contributions represent a form 
of electoral corruption. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-Kentucky) has vigorously argued 
that they do not, stating in 1998 Senate hearings, “The European Court of Human Rights 
ruled that laws banning ordinary citizens from spending money to promote or denigrate 
candidates in an election campaign was a breach of human rights.”113 Most objections to 
campaign finance reform are not this melodramatic. Rather, opponents typically argue 
that the original Buckley decision did not legitimate the increasingly broad anti-
corruption regulations that have been proposed in the last ten years. However, a close 
inspection of the Court’s evolving definition of corruption will demonstrate that the Court 
is today squarely opposed to the practices of 527 groups. 
Buckley On Corruption
In Buckley (1976), the Court stated that the essential purpose of campaign finance 
law is to prevent corruption and the appearance of corruption.114 The Court’s benchmark 
example of corruption is a large contribution given to arrange a quid pro quo favor from a 
political candidate or officeholder.115 Equally troublesome is “the appearance of 
corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a 
regime of large individual financial contributions.”116 The Court upheld contribution 
limits, reporting and disclosure requirements, and the public financing of presidential 
campaigns as a check upon corruption and the appearance of corruption.117
At the same time, Buckley struck down § 608(e)(1) of FECA, a proposed 
restriction on independent expenditures, because the vagueness of the provision 
undermined its ability to prevent influence-buying.118 In a prescient remark, the Court 
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noted that the provision could be easily circumvented: “It would naively underestimate 
the ingenuity and resourcefulness of persons and groups desiring to buy influence to 
believe that they would have much difficulty devising expenditures that skirted the 
restriction on express advocacy of election or defeat but nevertheless benefited the 
candidate's campaign.”119
Nonetheless, Buckley did not perceive a serious danger of corruption from 
independent expenditures. “Unlike contributions, such independent expenditures may 
well provide little assistance to the candidate's campaign and indeed may prove 
counterproductive. The absence of prearrangement and coordination of an expenditure 
with the candidate or his agent… undermines the value of the expenditure to the 
candidate.”120 The Court would revise this assertion in later cases, as it began to 
formulate a broader definition of corruption and apply it to independent expenditures. 
In Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), the Court 
upheld campaign finance restrictions on the political activities of the Michigan State 
Chamber of Commerce, a nonprofit corporation. It found that the State of Michigan had a 
compelling interest in preventing the corruption that would result from “the corrosive and 
distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with the help 
of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the 
corporation’s political ideas.”121 The decision shows the Court moving beyond the 
narrow definition of corruption advanced in Buckley, which focused on the quid pro quo 
corruption of elected officials. With Austin, the Court recognized that, “The integrity of 
the electoral process itself can be corrupted—by large independent expenditures on 
express advocacy.”122 There is no question that the independent expenditures of 527 
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groups now effectively function as express advocacy, which would place them within the 
Court’s expanding definition of corruption. 
In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000), the Court 
addressed the danger to the electoral process posed by soft money, and laid the 
foundation for its decision, three years later, to sustain the BCRA. In Shrink PAC, as it is 
commonly known, the Court upheld a Missouri statute limiting contributions to 
candidates for state office. It indicated its willingness to defer to a legislative finding of 
corruption, since the proposition that large contributions corrupted the political process 
was, by this point, “neither novel nor implausible.”123 In his concurrence, Breyer states 
that Buckley left the legislature “broad authority” to regulate soft money, adding that if 
Buckley does not permit Congress “sufficient leeway to enact comprehensive solutions to 
the problems posed by campaign finance… I believe the Constitution would require us to 
reconsider Buckley.”124
In dissent, Kennedy states that Buckley has not worked because it created a new 
dialect of “covert speech”: “What the Court does not do is examine and defend the 
substitute it has encouraged, covert speech funded by unlimited soft money. In my view 
that system creates dangers greater than the one it has replaced.”125 Echoing Breyer’s 
point, Kennedy states that the Court should “defer to [the legislature’s] political judgment 
that unlimited spending threatens the integrity of the electoral process.”126 Richard Hasen 
notes that Shrink PAC ultimatel y accepted the government’s anti-corruption rationale “on 
faith, not on evidence, believing that the point was virtually self-evident.”127 Another 
commentator interprets Shrink PAC as an indication that “given the right facts, the Court 
will ‘lower’ the standard to uphold regulations furthering different, although significant, 
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government interests. A lower standard would allow regulation of soft money and issue 
ads that, because of their nature, could not pass the corruption standard.”128
‘Electoral Strategy’ and Distortion
Before turning to McConnell, the Court’s most recent decision on soft money and 
corruption, I will review the recent academic discussion of independent expenditures and 
their potential to undermine the electoral process. The attempt to influence the identity of 
the person elected is commonly known as an ‘electoral strategy’, as opposed to a 
‘legislative strategy’ designed to influence the voting decisions of candidates once in 
office.129 Kathleen Sullivan refers to the electoral strategy as a ‘distortion’ in the system--
a form of corruption in which “the unequal deployment of resources in electoral 
campaigns causes the wrong people to get elected, distorting the true preferences of 
voters.”130 Given their unrestricted fundraising capabilities, 527s are uniquely capable of 
distorting voting preferences by swamping their opponents with negative advertising. 
Some commentators have dismissed the possibility that such distortion can lead to 
electoral corruption. Bruce Cain, discussing the problem of voter ignorance about 
candidates, objects to limits on campaign finance because “anything that lessens the 
amount of information in the system only makes that problem worse.”131 But this 
assumes that the information in the system is uniformly accurate and fair. It doesn’t 
address the problem that issue advocacy, particularly by 527s, may represent a glut of 
misinformation in the system, overwhelming more accurate information disseminated by 
the media. Nothing illustrates this problem more convincingly than the Swift Boat 
Veterans campaign. Supporters of Cain’s view might counter that the solution to the 
Swift Boat dilemma is not to eliminate § 527, but to ensure the accuracy of ads run by 
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527 groups. Yet it is difficult to imagine that a private or government agency could 
perform this function better than the media, which itself struggled to counteract the 
Veterans’ distortions.  
Sullivan questions distortion theory by arguing that a candidate’s ability to attract 
donations is, at least to some extent, an indicator of popularity.132 Expanding this theme, 
Bradley Smith writes that, “The ability to raise money is evidence of political prowess 
and popularity that would normally translate into votes, regardless of spending.”133 In 
other words, Smith reverses the typical complaint that a candidate won simply because he 
outspent his opponent-- i.e., that he purchased victory. In Smith's view, the winning 
candidate is able to outspend his opponents because his supporters wanted him to win 
badly enough that they funded that outcome.
This argument overlooks the fact that many voters cannot afford to contribute 
large sums to their candidate, yet are still committed to voting for him. Recognizing this 
fact, Cain suggests that a “better measure of intensity would weight the size of a 
monetary contribution according to the giver’s initial level of resources.”134 We can 
illustrate Cain’s model with a hypothetical incorporating elements of the Dean campaign. 
Suppose that Candidate X is supported by 100 wealthy voters who donate the maximum 
contribution of $2,000. He will raise more money than Candidate Y, supported by 1,000 
voters of modest means, who each give $10 over the Internet. Smith’s theory would 
indicate that Candidate X should receive more votes, since he was able to raise more 
money. Yet Candidate Y would win by 900 votes in this scenario. Cain’s model is more 
effective at measuring the intensity of Candidate Y's supporters, who are fiercely 
dedicated to their candidate yet make only small donations to his campaign. 
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In addition to this shortcoming, Smith’s theory cannot explain why so many 
individuals contributed to 527 groups, rather than the candidate of their choice, during the 
2004 election. Stephen Moore, president of the conservative 527 group Club for Growth, 
suggests an answer: “One way you can help persuade donors that their donations are 
being spent in an impactful way is by having them see an ad on TV that they helped pay 
for.”135 With so many 527 groups running their own ad campaigns, voters were able to 
fund the message they found most resonant or effective. Voters who supported Kerry but 
wanted to steer him in a more progressive direction could support MoveOn.org; those
who supported Bush, and felt that Kerry was most vulnerable on his service in Vietnam, 
could support the Swift Boat Veterans. The 527 field offered a diverse menu of 
advertising messages, many of which were more more effective and hard-hitting than 
those aired by the national campaigns. 
Smith concludes that, “The problem, if it exists, is not that some candidates ‘buy’ 
elections by spending too much, but that other candidates spend too little to reach the 
mass of voters.”136 This assumes that there is a financial threshold-- which Smith does 
not define-- above which the ‘problem’ of under-funding ceases to exist. This proposal, 
however, runs counter to the Buckley definition of corruption, which stated that large 
financial expenditures raise the appearance of corruption.137 The Court only underscored 
this connection when it acknowledged in McConnell that Buckley did not go far enough 
in defining corruption, and approving the means to combat it. 
McConnell on Corruption 
McConnell recognized what had been apparent for some time: that the distinction 
between express and issue advocacy, unclear from the start, was no longer meaningful. 
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The majority held that, “Buckley's express advocacy line has not aided the legislative 
effort to combat real or apparent corruption, and Congress enacted BCRA to correct the 
flaws it found in the existing system.”138 The Court remarked that its decision to uphold 
the BCRA was part of a larger pattern. Since Buckley, “We have consistently applied less 
rigorous scrutiny to contribution restrictions aimed at the prevention of corruption and the 
appearance of corruption.”139 The Court therefore upheld the Act’s broad regulation of 
soft money, because it creates an appearance of corruption and improper influence—even 
if it did not in fact secure such influence.140
Given the Court’s willingness to accept the government’s anticorruption interest, 
why didn’t the architects of the BCRA seek to ban 527 expenditures along with other 
forms of soft money? David Broder suggests a simple reason: its drafters “did not 
anticipate that the ban would simply divert the flow of big contributions into other 
channels.”141 But others argue that the BCRA was intended as a sort of legislative triage. 
Fred Wertheimer of Democracy 21 says that reform leaders “had to focus on solving the 
most dangerous campaign finance problems facing America.”142 Commentators from the 
Brookings Institution agree, suggesting that the BCRA didn’t address 527s because its 
principal goal was to “prohibit elected officials and party leaders from extracting 
unregulated gifts from corporations, unions and individual donors in exchange for access 
to and influence with policymakers.”143
IV. Repeal Is the Logical (and Only) Solution
Whatever the reason for its absence, one thing is clear: the BCRA did not 
overlook § 527 because 527 groups engage in a less damaging form of corruption than 
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corporations, unions, and individual donors.  No one has argued this point more 
insistently than the co-author of the BCRA, Senator McCain. He has denounced the 
activities of 527 groups in the 2004 election cycle, remarking in Congress that, “Some 
groups… have recently been set up for the sole purpose of raising or spending tens of 
millions of dollars in soft money to influence the 2004 Presidential and congressional 
elections… This blatant end run around the campaign finance laws should not be 
tolerated.”144
McCain’s description of a legal “end run” is an appropriate one. The activities of 
527 groups in the 2004 election, while legal, fell within the Court’s modern definition of 
corruption. The Swift Boat campaign represents an even more extreme form of 
corruption, not previously reviewed by the courts, in which a 527 group temporarily 
hijacks the campaign with false accusations. In order to complete the unfinished work of 
the BCRA, and stage a comprehensive attack on electoral corruption, Congress should 
repeal § 527. 
Repeal of § 527 Would Not Violate the First Amendment
This section will review the cases which establish that Congress can elect not to 
subsidize activities involving free expression, without violating the underlying First 
Amendment rights of the speakers. Opponents of 527 reform often claim that the 
regulation of issue advocacy violates the First Amendment, relying on the Court’s long-
established rule that political speech is at the core of the First Amendment.145 National 
Federation, discussed below, echoed these concerns when it ruled that § 527(j) has a 
“chilling effect” on First Amendment rights.146
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Bradley Smith argued in a 1998 article that, “Issue advocacy does not pose a 
sufficiently dangerous threat to justify the burdens that its regulation would impose on 
First Amendment rights. Or, in Buckley’s own language, contributions may only be 
limited for speech ‘advocating the election or defeat of a candidate.’”147 The Court 
rejected this reasoning in McConnell, however: “Congress has a fully legitimate interest 
in maintaining the integrity of federal officeholders and preventing corruption through 
the means it has chosen. Indeed, our above analysis turns on our finding that those 
interests are sufficient to satisfy First Amendment scrutiny.”148
There are other reasons why Smith’s argument is no longer persuasive. As 
demonstrated by the previous discussion of corruption, the modern issue ad effectively 
does advocate the election or defeat of a candidate. The boundary that Smith draws 
between issue and express advocacy, artificial even when Buckley was decided, has 
become “functionally meaningless” in the view of the Court.149 But more importantly, the 
regulation and even repeal of § 527 does not require the courts to perform a constitutional 
balancing in the first place.  Even if the issue advocacy of 527 groups did not raise a 
significant danger of corruption, the provision could be eliminated without violating the 
First Amendment rights of groups practicing such advocacy. 
Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) offers the clearest support for 
this proposition. In Cammarano, the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to  a tax 
statute which prohibited individual or corporate taxpayers from deducting amounts they 
spent on lobbying to promote or defeat legislation. The Cammaranos, individual 
taxpayers, argued that the statute violated their First Amendment rights, because it was 
based on the content of their speech. But the Court held that they were not being denied a 
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deduction because they were engaging in constitutionally protected activities; rather, they 
were simply being required to pay for the activities out of their own pocket.150 The Court 
rejected the notion that “First Amendment rights are somehow not fully realized unless 
they are subsidized by the State.”151 Regan v. Taxation With Representation of 
Washington, discussed below, reaffirmed this principle, and added that strict scrutiny is 
not required whenever Congress subsidizes some, but not all, speech.152
Such cases express a constitutional theory that is conventionally referred to as the 
“greater powers doctrine.”153 This doctrine holds that it is constitutional for the 
government to condition the grant of a nonmandatory benefit on the recipient’s 
willingness to comply with restrictions that might otherwise be unconstitutional.154 In 
order for the doctrine to apply it is necessary, of course, for the recipient to have the 
choice to opt-out of the restrictions, thereby forgoing the government benefit. 
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) demonstrates how the presence of an opt-
out reinforces the constitutionality of such government restrictions. In Rust, recipients of 
family planning funds under Title X of the Public Health Service Act challenged 
regulations promulgated by the Department of Health and Human Services. The 
regulations prohibited projects receiving Title X funds from offering abortion counseling. 
The Court held that although the regulations limited the speech of fund recipients in 
return for the subsidy, they did not violate their First Amendment rights.155 If they chose 
not to follow the government’s abortion counseling strictures, recipients could opt out by 
financing their own unsubsidized program.156 The Court remarked that, “We have never 
held that the Government violates the First Amendment simply by offering that 
choice.”157
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Similar to the regulation in Rust, § 527(i) contains an implicit opt-out. It requires 
groups that wish to be treated as 527s to give notice to the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Groups which do not wish to make disclosure will simply not provide notice, and 
relinquish their tax-exempt status under § 527. If they opt out, they still have the option 
of disseminating their message through other channels—for example, they can convert to 
§ 501(c)(3) or (4) status. Since Congress has no obligation to subsidize 527s in order to 
protect their First Amendment rights, it would not be violating those rights by repealing § 
527 altogether. 
Section 527 Is a Tax Subsidy That Can Be Withdrawn
It is evident from these decisions that the courts view § 527 as a Congressional 
subsidy which the legislature is free to restrict or repeal. However, opponents of 527 
reform have responded with two theories which argue that § 527, either directly or 
indirectly, imposes a penalty. 
The first argues that by not subsidizing constitutionally protected political speech, 
Congress automatically penalizes it. The plaintiffs in Rust, for example, claimed that, 
“Because Title X continues to fund speech ancillary to pregnancy testing in a manner that 
is not evenhanded with respect to views and information about abortion, it invidiously 
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint.”158 The Court however dismissed this claim, 
stating, “A refusal to fund protected activity, without more, cannot be equated with the 
imposition of a ‘penalty’ on that activity.”159
The second theory argues that the disclosure requirements of § 527(j) represent a 
penalty on the exercise of protected speech.160 Yet courts and commentators have 
typically rejected this view, arguing instead that Congress is simply qualifying its 
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legislative grace when it places restrictions on § 527.161 They do not dispute that political 
speech is constitutionally protected. Rather, they rely on the premise, discussed 
previously, that it is constitutional for the government to condition the grant of a 
nonmandatory benefit on the recipient’s willingness to comply with restrictions that 
might otherwise be unconstitutional. Cammarano v. U.S. upheld this principle when it 
ruled that the ordinary and necessary business deduction is a Congressional subsidy.162
As a result, Cammarano held that if Congress chooses to deny a deduction, it does not 
impose a penalty on the taxpayer.163 “Congress has not undertaken to penalize taxpayers 
for certain types of advocacy; it has merely allowed some, not all, expenses as deductions. 
Deductions are a matter of grace, not of right.”164
This reasoning was extended to tax exemptions in Regan v. Taxation With 
Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1997). Although this case focused on § 
501(c), its analysis can be easily transferred to the 527 subsidy. Suit was brought in 
Regan by a nonprofit organization seeking a declaratory judgment that it qualified for 
tax-exempt status under § 501(c), after its application was denied by the IRS. The IRS 
had concluded that a substantial part of its activities would consist of attempting to 
influence legislation. The Court held that the legislature’s decision not to subsidize the 
exercise of a First Amendment right such as freedom of speech did not infringe that 
right:165
The Code does not deny TWR the right to receive deductible contributions to support 
its non-lobbying activity, nor does it deny TWR any independent benefit on account 
of its intention to lobby. Congress has merely refused to pay for the lobbying out of 
public monies. This Court has never held that the Court must grant a benefit such as 
TWR claims here to a person who wishes to exercise a constitutional right.166
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This is particularly true of tax subsidies, the Court noted, because legislatures have 
considerable freedom in creating classifications and other distinctions in the tax code.167
A lower court rejected that argument in a case frequently cited by opponents of § 
527 reform, National Federation of Republican Assemblies v. U.S., 148 F.Supp.2d 1273
(S.D.Ala. 2001). The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against the enforcement 
of §§ 527(i) and (j), added in 2000.168 They argued that § 527(j) represented a penalty 
rather than a tax, because it imposes a “penalty” in the event of a “failure to make the 
required disclosures… [or] a failure to include any of the information required to be 
shown by such disclosures or to show the correct information.”169 The court agreed, 
noting that Revenue Ruling 2000-49 and Form 1120-POL, the tax form filled out by 527 
organizations, both identified § 527(j) as a penalty.170 The court rejected the 
government’s argument that organizations can opt out of its requirements by simply 
choosing not to disclose, and surrendering the tax benefits of § 527.171 In a case the 
following year (2002), the same Alabama court ruled that § 527(j) was unconstitutional to 
the extent it required disclosure of expenditures in connection with federal electoral 
advocacy.172 Opponents of § 527 reform often cite both cases when arguing that the 
disclosure requirements of § 527(j) represent a penalty on free speech.
The 2002 case, which held § 527(j) unconstitutional, was overruled by Mobile 
Republican Assembly v. U.S., 353 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2003). The court held that § 527(j) 
is part of the overall tax scheme, rather than a separate penalty.173 It stated that the 
interpretation of § 527(j) was controlled by Regan, which defined § 501(c) as a tax 
subsidy.174 By enacting § 527(j), Congress did not establish barriers to the appellees’ 
exercise of their free-speech rights.175 Instead, Congress set forth certain requirements 
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that must be met in exchange for a tax subsidy.176 Political organizations can opt-out, 
choosing not to register under § 527(i), and avoid these requirements.177 As Donald 
Tobin has correctly noted, § 527(j) only punishes organizations that agree to comply with 
the statute, but then fail to do so.178 The provision does not impose an absolute penalty, 
but a contingent one. Under the reasoning of Mobile Republican, Congress is free to 
repeal the 527 subsidy without penalizing groups which previously relied on it. 
V. The Likely Outcome of Repeal
The last section of this paper will focus on the likely outcome of repeal. It is 
probable that many 527 groups would convert to § 501(c)(3) or (4) status following 
repeal, although these provisions are not as attractive to political organizations as § 527 
for reasons that will be made clear.
As discussed previously, 501(c)(3) groups must be engaged in religious, 
charitable, scientific, literary, or educational activities, among others. Because education 
is an exempt activity for (c)(3) groups, some have successfully argued that “they are not 
intervening in a campaign, but educating the public with respect to certain important 
issues.”179 Acknowledging this overlap between educational and political activity, the 
IRS has stated that, “Sometimes… the activity is both—it is educational but it also 
constitutes intervention in a political campaign.”180 One such ill-defined electioneering 
activity is the distribution of voter guides, for which the Service has not issued guidance 
in two decades.181
501(c)(4) organizations are allowed to have limited involvement in political 
campaigns so long as they are primarily engaged in nonpolitical activities advancing 
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social welfare.182 For this reason, § 501(c)(4) would be more attractive than § 501(c)(3) 
to organizations forced to switch from § 527 status. However, donors to (c)(4) groups are 
subject to gift tax—a major drawback in comparison to the current § 527, which exempts 
donors from gift tax. This has not discouraged advocacy groups from exploiting § 
501(c)(4) in the past, however. 
501(c)(4) groups were extensively used to promote issue advocacy in the 1996 
campaign cycle.183 One example was the Better America Foundation, a (c)(4) group 
founded in 1993 by Senator Bob Dole (R-Kansas).184 The group’s articles of 
incorporation stated that it was created to “promote and advocate values and principles 
espoused by the Republican Party.”185 The BAF told donors that there was no limit on 
individual contributions, and no requirement for public disclosure of contributors’ names. 
The group became embroiled in controversy after spending $1.2M on a television ad 
featuring Senator Dole, leading him to close down the group in 1995 and return 
contributions to donors.186 Despite such misfires, 527 groups began converting en masse 
to § 501(c)(4) status after the 2000 disclosure requirements were added. “We’d be 
running out of fingers and toes” trying to count the number, remarked GOP election 
lawyer Benjamin Ginsberg at the time.187 The migration to § 501(c)(4) proved short-lived, 
since 527 groups quickly adapted to the disclosure provisions. But it is conceivable that if 
§ 527 were repealed, § 501(c)(4) would emerge as the next-best alternative. 
Political organizations have discovered a number of ways to capitalize on § 
501(c)(4). They can channel political advocacy through a social welfare organization 
organized under section (c)(4), while shielding contributors from FECA disclosure 
requirements.188 501(c)(4) groups can also piggy-back onto the § 501(c)(3) education 
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exemption. Although education is not a listed exemption for (c)(4) groups, “The Service 
has so blurred the distinction between section (c)(3) and section (c)(4) that it treats the 
section (c)(3) exempt purposes as exempt purposes for section (c)(4) organizations as 
well.”189 Candidates often create a complicated shell game of (c)(3) and (c)(4) groups to 
evade restrictions on exempt activities. For instance, a corporate contributor may transfer 
money to a (c)(3) group claiming to be involved in exempt educational activity. This 
group may then transfer some of the money to a (c)(4) group, which can contribute it 
directly to the candidate.190
If the previous attempts to reform § 527 are any guide, the repeal of § 527 would 
likely cause groups to reconstitute under § 501(c)(3) or (c)(4). Congress should learn 
from its own failure to include § 527 in the BCRA by restricting (c)(3) and (c)(4) at the 
same time it repeals § 527. It should analyze the ways in which they have been used in 
the past as vehicles for soft-money political spending, and explicitly prohibit these 
practices. In particular, the IRS should narrow the definition of educational activity 
available to 501(c)(3) groups, given that “the distinction between non-partisan 
education… and biased education intended to influence the outcome of an election is 
anything but clear.”191 In addition, charitable organizations seeking exemption under § 
501(c)(4) should be prohibited from participating in political campaigns. 
Would Repeal of § 527 Cripple the Democratic Party?
This paper will conclude with a brief discussion of the political ramifications of 
repeal. While the legal arguments previously introduced would supply ammunition to 
both Democrats and Republicans, there is no doubt that repeal of § 527 would be fought 
on a political rather than legal battlefield. Both sides would be keenly aware that repeal 
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could disable the fundraising ability of the Democratic Party. If the soft money flow were 
extinguished by the repeal of § 527 (in conjunction with McCain- Feingold), the 2008 
election would occur in a hard money world. In every election cycle between 1976 and 
2000, the GOP raised far more hard money than the DNC. The 1999-2000 cycle was 
typical in that respect: the RNC raised $377M, the DNC $260M.192
The recent election cycle reversed this trend, however. The DNC raised $389M 
between January 1, 2003 and November 22, 2004, and the RNC $385M.193 As RNC 
Chairman Ed Gillespie acknowledged, the DNC succeeded in broadening their net and 
attracting small donors.194 It is impossible to predict whether the DNC will again 
outperform the RNC in 2008. However, it seems unlikely that the ‘perfect storm’
conditions of the 2004 election-- in terms of voter mobilization, and the political passions 
ignited-- will repeat themselves. Looking to 2008, Republicans can reasonably expect 
that they will raise more hard money than Democrats, but less soft money through 527 
groups, in the absence of repeal.
As a result, the Republican Party would have the greatest incentive to repeal § 
527, shielding their 2008 nominee from the renewed efforts of MoveOn.org and George 
Soros. President Bush, in fact, agreed in late August of 2004 to join John McCain in a 
suit against the FEC, intended to force the agency to take action against 527s.195 This 
would seem to be a largely symbolic election-year proposal; it is unclear why a lawsuit 
would be preferable to Congressional action repealing § 527. Nonetheless, it is 
conceivable that some of the same Republican figures who fought so hard against the 
BCRA will soon champion the repeal of § 527. While the Republican Party could try to 
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develop their own network of 527 groups, it would be more logical for it to cut off the 
flow of soft money, and outspend the Democrats in hard money. 
While the repeal of § 527 could leave the Democrats temporarily underfunded, 
the alternative would be more damaging to the political process. With pro-Republican 
groups now beginning to proliferate, the 2008 election promises an even more pitched 
and unscrupulous battle between liberal and conservative 527 groups. Both sides may be 
tempted to adopt the corrupt practices of the Swift Boat Veterans, the 527 group which 
had arguably the greatest impact on the 2004 race. It is unrealistic to expect the media, 
Senator McCain, and others watchdogs to restrain 527 groups as the national parties grow 
increasingly dependent on them. Congress should repeal 527 well in advance of the 2008 
election, in order to give both parties time to readjust their fundraising strategies. The 
longer a serious debate on repeal is deferred, the more deeply politicized it is likely to 
become. 
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